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ESSAYS

Tort Law Reform: Strict Liability
and the Collateral Source Rule

Do Not Mix
Victor E. Schwartz*
The imposition of strict liability and the simultaneous application of the collateral source rule to innocent defendants represent
unfair and unsound public policy. Strict liability and the collateral
source rule should not be mixed; nevertheless, our courts inadvertently blend them. A fundamental reform that would help stabilize
the American tort law system is to abolish the collateral source
rule in toto whenever a claimant relies on a strict liability theory.
The collateral source rule is appropriate only when a claimant
proves that the defendant was at fault in causing an injury.
There is a broad view in the United States that the American
tort system has become unwieldly and too expensive.' Many blame
*Partner in the law firm of Crowell & Moring, Washington, D.C. A.B. 1962, Boston
University; J.D. 1965, Columbia University. Mr. Schwartz is the drafter of the Uniform
Product Liability Act, formerly Chairman of the Working Task Force of the Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liability, and Chairman of the Federal Interagency Council
on Insurance. Mr. Schwartz is coauthor of W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS (7th ed. 1982), author of V. SCHWARTZ, COmPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (2d
ed. 1985), and coauthor of V. SCHWARTZ, P. LEz & K. KELLY, GUIDE TO MULTISTATE LITIGATION (1985).

1. The current liability insurance crisis has reached enormous proportions. Insurance
is unavailable or unaffordable for many municipalities. Both small and large businesses find
product liability insurance either unavailable or unaffordable. Restrictions on coverage
mean that insurance may not be predicted against claims that arise in a certain year but
that do not manifest themselves until later.
This Essay is not intended to suggest that a modification of the collateral source rule is
all that is necessary to "fix the system." Limits also must be placed on damages for pain and
suffering, which may be wholly inappropriate when a claim is based on strict liability. The
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the advent of strict liability theories. Where American tort law
went awry may be not so much in its adoption of strict liability
when appropriate,but rather in converting from a fault-based system to a strict liability system without any adjustment of its damage rules. Under traditional tort law, an injured claimant may receive damages that are many times his actual out-of-pocket losses.
For example, the claimant may receive damages for pain and suffering that are nine to ten times out-of-pocket costs plus double
recovery for out-of-pocket costs because of the collateral source
rule. On the other hand, when an individual suffers an insured loss
for which no legal recourse is available, his "expectation" is to recover only actual out-of-pocket losses or maybe only a portion of
them. If the courts had made appropriate adjustments in the tort
damage rules when they spawned strict liability, our tort system
would be far less wounded than it is today.2
I. THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE-A RULE EMBRACED IN FAULT

The collateral source rule "ordains that, in computing damages against a tortfeasor, no reduction be allowed on account of
benefits received by the plaintiff from other sources, even though
they have partially or wholly mitigated his loss."' The first application of the collateral source rule in the United States occurred in
1854. 4 It has been a part of tort law ever since. The rule grew out
of the premise "that the wrongdoer ought not to benefit-in having what he owes diminished-by the fact that the victim was prudent enough to have other sources of compensation, which he was
history of tort law shows that damages for pain and suffering were rooted in fault, not compensation. See O'Connell and Carpenter, Payment for Pain and Suffering Through History,

50 INS. COUNSEL J. 411 (1983). Another fundamental reform goes to the type of harm for
which compensation is appropriate. Traditionally tort law was limited to physical harm to

persons and damaged property. Insurance crises of major proportions did not arise while
these limits were maintained.

2. Reform of tort damage rules is needed in several areas to accompany the development of strict liability. For example, when liability is imposed without regard to fault, it
may be appropriate to limit the types of harm for which claimants may receive compensation (e.g., to limit recovery for mental anguish to that which is caused by actual physical
harm). It also may be appropriate to set a limit on the total amount of pain and suffering

damages that may be recovered in strict liability cases.
3. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 1478 (1966).
4. See Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages:The Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARv.
L. REV. 741, 741 & n.3 (1964) (citing The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. (17 How.)
152 (1854); Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of Damages, 46
MINN. L. REV. 669 (1962)).
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probably paying for." 5
Under the rule, an injured party who recovers his salary, pension, or medical expenses from an insurer or other third party may
still recover full damages for all these items from the person who is
liable for the injury.6 To this extent the claimant will receive
double payment. Although courts openly have recognized this fact,
they stand by the principle that the defendant "wrongdoer" should
not benefit from payments that come to the claimant from a collateral source-a source deemed legally separate from the defendant.
Professor Fleming observed many years ago that "[t]o anyone a
little troubled by the notion that this might mean double recovery
for the plaintiff, the stereotyped response has been that this is still
'7
better than letting the defendant profit."
The critics of the collateral source rule have pointed out the
weaknesses of this argument by stressing the compensatory goal of
the tort system. As Professors Harper and James have suggested:
It may be said that the defendant deserves being made to pay in full because
of the moral quality of his act. Now there can be no question here of who
should fairly bear a loss, as between an innocent and a guilty party, for by
hypothesis the innocent man's loss has been made whole and we are discussing a further payment beyond that. There may be mixed with this feeling of
desert a desire to deter dangerous conduct, but that merits separate treatment. What is left under this head, then, springs from a feeling of indignation
or resentment and a desire to punish as such. Surely, there is no place for
such a notion in any philosophy of social insurance. It has no acknowledged
place even in tort liability based on fault, for the theory of damages here is
purely compensatory.8

Nonetheless, once courts have characterized the tort system as one
based on fault, they have found a certain symmetry to the application of a rule that prevents the defendant from benefiting in any
way from his wrong. For example, the Supreme Court of New Mexico has stated:
The right of redress for wrong is fundamental. Charity cannot be made a

substitute for such right, nor can benevolence be made a set-off against the
acts of a tort-feasor.9
5.

J. O'CoNmmJ

& R.

HENDERSON, TORT LAW, No-FAULT AND BEYOND, 114 (1975) (em-

phasis added).
6.

2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.22, at 1343-44 (1957). By contract,

many insurers will become subrogated to the plaintiff's rights against the tortfeasor, but the
collateral source rule does not depend on the insurance contract provisions.
7. Fleming, supra note 3, at 1483 (footnote omitted).
8. 2 F.

HARPER

& F. JAMEs, supra note 6, § 25.22, at 1345 (emphasis changed) (foot-

note omitted).
9.

Mobley v. Garcia, 54 N.M. 175, 177, 217 P.2d 256, 257 (1950).
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The Supreme Court of Texas has observed:
The theory behind the collateral source rule is that a wrongdoer should not
have the benefit of insurance independently procured by the injured party.10

A New Jersey court has observed:
All the collateral source rule does is to preclude a tortfeasor, that is, one
whose fault caused the injury, from setting up in mitigation of damages, benefits derived from the injured person from some collateral source."

Lest the reader feel there is an overemphasis on quotes from judicial opinions, they are put forth in hac verba because courts forgot
this fundamental-that the collateral source rule is a fault-based
concept-when they developed the theory of strict liability.

II.

THE ENGINE BEHIND STRICT LIABILITY: RISK DISTRIBUTION

Strict liability, by definition, is distinct from fault. The Restatement (Second) of Torts in section 402A states, in part, that
liability can be imposed even though "the seller has exercised all
possible care in the preparation and sale of his product."
While the application of strict liability in the design and duty
to warn areas sometimes has become muddled with fault in that a
defendant may be able to escape liability by showing that he
neither knew nor could have known of the risk, " recently the highest courts in Arizona, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, and
Oregon have indicated that liability should be imposed in this precise situation and that a totally innocent manufacturer may be
subject to liability.' As the Supreme Court of New Jersey
explained:
One of the most important arguments generally advanced for imposing strict
liability is that the manufacturers and distributors of defective products can
best allocate the costs of the injuries resulting from those products. The premise is that the price of a product should reflect all of its costs, including the
10. Brown v. American Transfer and Storage Co., 601 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Tex.), cert
denied, 449 U.S. 1015 (1980).
11. Cozzi v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 154 N.J. Super. 519, 528, 381 A.2d 1235,
1240 (App. Div. 1977); see also Quinones v. Passaic Boys Club, 183 N.J. Super. 531, 535, 444
A.2d 630, 632 (Law Div. 1982) ("It is axiomatic that a party who becomes obligated to pay
damages because of a wrong done may not benefit by payments or medical services rendered
to the injured party from collateral sources."), overruled on other grounds, 199 N.J. Super.
127, 488 A.2d 1032 (App. Div. 1985).
12. See Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TFx L. REv. 777
(1983).
13. See Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., No. 17766-PR (Ariz. Nov. 14, 1985); Heyes v. Ariens Co.,
391 Mass. 407, 462 N.E.2d 273 (1984); Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434 (Mo.
1984); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982); Phillips v.
Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
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cost of injuries caused by the product. This can best be accomplished by imposing liability on the manufacturer and distributors. These persons can insure against liability and incorporate the cost of insurance in the price of the
product. In this way, the costs of the product will be borne by those who
profit from it: the manufacturers and distributors who profit from its sale and
the buyers who profit from its use."

The notion of risk distribution, first articulated by Justice
Traynor,15 has permeated other areas of tort law.16 Again and again
courts have stressed that the reason the innocent defendant should
pay the price is that the defendant is in a better position to distribute the risk. Thus, placing the risk on the defendant is considered "far preferable to imposing it on the innocent victims who
suffer illnesses and disability from defective products."' 7

III. THE

COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE AND STRICT LIABILITYTHE IMPROPER MIXTURE

It should be clear to the reader that by justifying strict liability in terms of risk distribution the courts have surgically removed
from strict liability the very basis on which the collateral source
rule is premised. In terms of fundamentals, when courts remove
the basis of a rule, the rule itself should be abandoned. Apart from
this logical syllogism, however, sound economics also demands the
abolition of the collateral source rule when a defendant has been
found strictly liable. Given that risk distribution is the nub of
strict liability, it is foolish to distribute a risk for which the victim
already has been compensated. When the tort system distributes a
previously compensated-for risk, it, in effect, redistributes the risk
to a different insurance system. This redistribution makes poor economic sense.
In that regard, the insurance system represents a more efficient means of compensating injured parties to the extent of coverage. The percentage of each premium dollar paid to claimants as
damages or benefits for health insurance, disability insurance, and
14. Beshada, 90 N.J. at 205, 447 A.2d at 547.
15. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1962).
16. See, e.g., Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co., 34 Cal. 3d 49, 59 n.14, 665 P.2d 947,
953 n.14, 192 Cal. Rptr. 857, 863 n.14 (1983) (in suit against defendant who was responsible
for location, installation, and maintenance of telephone booth in which plaintiff was standing when struck by an automobile, court noted that "imposition of liability would not be
unduly burdensome to defendants given the probable availability of insurance for these
types of accidents which defendants themselves maintain do not recur with great
frequency").
17. Beshada, 90 N.J. at 206, 447 A.2d at 547.
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pensions is quite high. For example, for group health insurance
coverage in 1982, payments reached eighty-eight percent of premiums.18 By way of contrast, the percentage of each premium dollar
paid out to injured parties under casualty property lines of insurance is substantially less. On average, between the years 1977 and
1981, the casualty insurance payout rate was only sixty-five percent of premiums. 9 This statistic does not mean that the sixty-five
cents "paid" as a claim reaches an injured person's bank account.
In asbestos litigation, for example, plaintiff's fees and expenses for
20
tried and settled claims averaged forty-one percent of the payout.
The net compensation received by claimants was thirty-eight percent of the premium dollar.
Thus, not only does compensating the victim twice make poor
economic sense, but also the secondary compensation system-the
tort system-represents a relatively inefficient insurance mechanism. One does not have to be an actuary to appreciate that it is
far easier to return premium dollars to injured parties through accident and health insurance. One knows who the insured person is
and an insurer can assess that risk (as contrasted with liability insurance where the "potential" victim is unknown). Cost savings
also arise because lawyers and the judicial system do not need to
involve themselves whenever an injury occurs.
Mixing the collateral source rule with strict liability also represents a fundamentally unsound public policy: The "mix" treats
innocent manufacturers, or other classes of innocent defendants,
the same as negligent manufacturers. This treatment is indefensible public policy. As New Jersey Senator Frank R. Lautenberg
has observed:
[W]e need a system that rewards the prudent product maker, and penalizes
the imprudent. The courts in some cases have approached a system of absolute liability where a manufacturer can be found liable no mater how careful,
or how circumspect it was when it designed a product. The careful manufacturer can be found as liable as if it were negligent. I think that is wrong. If we
are to encourage prudent behavior, we have
to reward it, by distinguishing
21
between the prudent and the imprudent.

Unfortunately, the simultaneous application of the collateral
18. See

HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSUR-

12, 14 (1984 Update).
See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

ANCE DATA

19.

OF INDEPENDENT INSURERS, GREENBO0K

1983; A CoMPi-

LATION OF PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE STATIsTICs 20.

20. See J. KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FELSTINER & M. SHANLEY, COSTS OF ASBESTOS LrnGATION 36 (Institute for Civil Justice 1983).

21. S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 109 (1984).
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source rule and strict liability commits the very sin Senator
Lautenberg chastizes.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The time has come for American tort law and American judges
to stop thinking in boxes, one box for the collateral source rule and
another box for strict liability. Rather, the courts should synthesize
the rationale underlying each rule. Once the policies underlying
each rule are examined carefully, they will be found to be totally
inconsistent. The collateral source rule is based on fault; strict liability is based on risk distribution. If a defendant is not deemed at
fault, courts should not require him to reimburse a plaintiff who
has already been paid by another source. Such payment represents
unsound economic thinking, and it places an unnecessary cost on
an ever weakening tort system.
Finally, and most importantly, it is unsound public policy to
treat negligent and innocent defendants alike. If courts are to use
the tort system to impose strict liability, they should limit the financial burdens imposed on defendants to losses that the claimant
actually has incurred.

